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Doors Widen to the West: China’s Entry in the World 
Trade Organization Will Ease Some Restrictions on 
Foreign Law Firms 
Susan E. Vitale* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the People’s Republic of China (China) officially opened 
its economy to Western business.1 After more than two decades, 
China has been admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
thus completing its journey toward becoming an international 
economy.2 Chinese and Western officials and commentators claim 
WTO accession is “a new stage” in China’s opening its doors to the 
West (open door policy).3  
An issue largely overlooked in the negotiations surrounding 
China’s WTO accession was whether China will ease restrictions on 
foreign law firms. Currently, China severely limits the practice of 
foreign law firms. For example, China prohibits foreign law firms 
from interpreting Chinese laws and advising their clients on the 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002.  
 1. Ji Chongwei & Sang Baichuan, Commentary: Deng Xiaoping & China’s Opening to 
the Outside World, CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE, July 23, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9917846. 
China’s open door policy began with former leader Deng Xiaoping. Id. He revolutionized China 
with statements like “[i]t is an open world now, [a]ll peoples and countries need to learn merits 
and advanced technology from other peoples and countries.” Id. He believed China “could not 
develop through conservatism and parochial arrogance, and closing the door would only leave 
[China] lagging further behind the world and the times.” Id. 
 2. Newscast: China Officially Enters World Trade Organization (Minnesota Public 
Radio, Marketplace Morning Report, Dec. 11, 2001), available at 2001 WL 23999582 (stating 
that China officially entered the WTO on Dec. 11, 2001); see also China reached the final and 
formal agreement for WTO accession, CHINAONLINE NEWS, at http://www.chinaonline.com/ 
issues/wto/newsarchive/cs-protected/2001/september/Col091701.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 
2001).  
 3. China committed to open economic policy after WTO entry: President, CHINA DAILY, 
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/wto/news/b15jiang.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2001) 
(quoting China’s President Jiang Zemin saying “with the country’s entry into the WTO, China 
will enter a new stage of [opening up]”). 
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application of those laws.4 Although WTO negotiations mentioned 
market access for foreign law firms in China, they did not fully 
grapple with this issue.5 Nonetheless, market access for foreign law 
firms will increase foreign investment in China.6 The resulting 
economic changes will spur a greater demand for legal professionals.7  
This Note addresses the future of foreign law firms in China. Part 
I explores the current restrictions imposed on foreign law firms in 
China. For comparative purposes, Part II illustrates Japan’s 
restrictions imposed on foreign lawyers and shows how Japan’s 
accession to the WTO changed these restrictions. Part III discusses 
China’s accession to the WTO, gives a brief overview of the general 
procedures required for a nation to join the WTO, and explores 
China’s reasons for entering the WTO. This part also uses the United 
States to illustrate some of the reasons and concerns surrounding 
China’s WTO entry and how these reasons may affect China’s 
treatment of foreign law firms. Part IV analyzes what WTO entry 
may mean for foreign law firms in China. This part argues that some 
changes in China’s treatment of foreign law firms may occur as a 
direct result of entry into the WTO, but that the vast majority of 
 
 4. Ministry of Justice, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Foreign Law 
Firms Establishing Offices in China Tentative Provisions, 6 CHINA L. & PRAC. 7 (1992) 
[hereinafter Tentative Provisions]. 
 5. See Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, CRS ISSUE BRIEF IB91121, at 11 
(Aug. 3, 2000). Opening market access for legal services is merely parenthetically mentioned as 
part of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and China. Id. The United States 
advocates “[e]nhanced market access, [legal] transparency, economic deregulation and 
investment decisions based upon market disciplines.” Rep. on Trade Expansion Priorities 
Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 13116, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,439, 24,493 (May 6, 1999). The United 
States seeks to eliminate “China’s multiple and overlapping barriers to U.S. exports of 
industrial goods, agricultural products and U.S. services.” Rep. on Trade Expansion Priorities 
Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12901, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,604, 52,607 (Oct. 8, 1997). The United 
States wanted “the Chinese government to develop an accession package that opens markets 
and commits China to create an environment conducive to international trade, requiring 
compliance with WTO rules and internationally accepted norms of transparency, predictability 
and the rule of law.” Id. Likewise, China’s President Jiang Zemin says China is “committed to 
the development of an open economy.” China committed to open economic policy after WTO 
entry: President, supra note 3.  
 6. See generally State Councilor Wu Yi foresees economic openness after WTO entry, 
CHINAONLINE NEWS, at http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/currentnews/secure/ 
B200091103.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2001) (discussing the future of foreign investment in 
China).  
 7. See Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 275, 281 (1992). 
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changes will occur over time. Part V proposes some measures the 
United States could take in order to expedite market access for 
foreign law firms. Finally, Part VI concludes that while China will 
ease some restrictions immediately, the majority of limitations China 
imposes of foreign law firms will diminish as a result of China’s 
increasing participation in the international marketplace. 
I. CHINA’S CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN LAW FIRMS 
China officially opened its doors to foreign law firms in 1993, but 
these firms received less than a carte blanche welcome.8 China’s 
Ministry of Justice and State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce still greet foreign firms with the policies outlined in 
“Foreign Law Firms Establishing Offices in China Tentative 
Provisions” (Tentative Provisions).9 The Tentative Provisions impose 
strict regulations limiting the practice of foreign law firms in China 
including: a strict governmental limit on the number of foreign firms 
allowed to set up a branch office in China; a geographical ban on 
those law firms that receive a license; prohibitions on a foreign firm’s 
ability to interpret, advise, and issue opinions concerning Chinese 
laws; a ban on hiring Chinese lawyers; and severe restrictions on the 
chief representative(s) of foreign law firms.  
 
 8. Yujie Gu, Note, Entering the Chinese Legal Market: A Guide for American Lawyers 
Interested in Practicing Law in China, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 173, 196 (1999). Gu suggests that 
China opened its doors to foreign law firms in 1992, but also states that China did not grant 
foreign law firms formal rights until 1993. Id. Gu also proffers that China allowed foreign law 
firms to enter in order to “allay investors fears” by presenting the “semblance of a sound legal 
system.” Id. at 195 (quoting Matt Forney, Outside the Law: Reform Reversals Hit Foreign Law 
Firms in China, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2, 1997, at 18). Foreign law firms entering China 
symbolize both China’s movement towards opening its door to the West and reforming its legal 
profession. Id. at 196 (referring to Overseas Law Firms Set up in China, ASIA INFO DAILY 
NEWS SERV., June 28, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 10654306).  
 9. Tentative Provisions, supra note 4, at 7. See generally Patricia Ginsberg, Note, An 
Ethical Dilemma of American Attorneys in China: The Conflict Between the Duty of 
Confidentiality to Clients and the Requirement of Disclosure to the Chinese Government, 12 
INT’L L. PRACTICUM 47 (1999) (discussing the Tentative Provisions, noting that they currently 
govern foreign law firms in China).  
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p223 Vitale  4/24/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 7:223 
 
 
A. Licensing Issues for Foreign Law Firms in China 
The Tentative Provisions outline the establishment and 
termination of legal business as well as the administration of foreign 
law firm offices.10 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Tentative Provisions, 
foreign law firms must obtain approval from the Ministry of Justice 
and register with the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce before the Chinese government permits them to set up a 
satellite office.11 Approval from the Ministry of Justice, however, is a 
limited privilege. For example, in 1993, the Chinese government 
mandated that no more than forty foreign law firms could establish a 
branch office in China, despite the numerous foreign law firms 
requesting market access.12 The Ministry of Justice does not provide 
evaluative criteria for obtaining a license.13 Consequently, none of the 
foreign law firms know definitively what criteria China uses to 
determine their ability or inability to receive a license.14 This 
ambiguity occurs, in part, because the Tentative Provisions are not 
regarded as the “hard-line” rule, but rather “as a source of authority 
for the government to expel foreign firms should they choose to.”15 
Article 26 supports this explanation, providing that “[t]he Ministry of 
Justice shall be responsible for the interpretation of these 
Provisions.”16  
 
 10. Tentative Provisions, supra note 4, at 7. The Tentative Provisions, effective until July 
1, 1993, describe “the setting up and termination, legal business and administration of offices of 
foreign law firms in China.” Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Hongming Xiao, The Internationalization of China’s Legal Services Market, in 1 
PERSPECTIVES 26, 28 (date unknown) (on file with author); see also Gu, supra note 8, at 199 
(demonstrating that in 1996 two hundred foreign law firms witnessed China’s Ministry of 
Justice issue only fourteen licenses, of which American law firms received four). 
 13. Gu, supra note 8, at 207. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Edward A. Adams, Firms Join Legal ‘Gold Rush’ in China, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1996, at 
1 (discussing how the rules are not explicit guidance, as evidenced by firms operating unofficial 
offices in China with the full knowledge of the Chinese government, and stating that China is a 
country developing its ability to rule by law). 
 16. Tentative Provisions, supra note 4, at 7. Article 26 exhibits an expansion of the 
Chinese government’s authority rather than a limitation. Jerry B. Edmonds, China Severely 
Restricts Foreign Law Firms, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 1994, at 12. These types of expansion 
provisions inhibit Western investors from believing that the Chinese government is moving 
away from a corrupt government and other governmental abuses of power. See Lee Hamilton, 
Introduction to BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS, 1, 5 (James R. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/12
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Recognizing the fierce competition for these licenses, foreign law 
firms realize they must establish activity in China in order to obtain a 
license.17 Paradoxically, foreign law firms also recognize that 
operating an unofficial foreign law firm in China violates the 
Tentative Provisions.18 Nevertheless, some foreign law firms choose 
to violate the Tentative Provisions and establish unofficial satellite 
 
Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie eds., The AEI Press 1994). Hamilton illustrates the problems 
China encounters when it does not govern its people by law. Id. Hamilton demonstrates that 
governmental abuses rule China in the absence of law. Id. He mentions governmental abuses 
such as “official corruption, absence of due process, torture and other forms of inhumane 
treatment of prisoners, the use of criminal sanctions against dissenters, and a politically biased 
‘justice.’” Id. Traditionally, China is a pervasive government, particularly in the area of 
economic activity. See Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A 
Primer for Investors, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 345, 346 (1997). The Chinese 
government’s roles included “regulator, business operator, business owner, business partner, 
[and] sovereign borrower.” Id. at 348. “In the Communist era, the state has been the dominant 
economic actor. As a consequence, the development of law as a system of norms governing 
economic activity involving private parties was stunted for many years.” Id. at 346. Once Deng 
Xiaoping became the leader of China in 1978, he “made it clear that the construction of a legal 
system would be an indispensable element of the newly-proclaimed modernization policy.” Id. 
China’s enactment of recent legislation concerning its lawyers shows the continuing 
modernization of China’s legal system. Charles D. Paglee, Law on Lawyers and Legal 
Representation, CHINALAW WEB, at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw58.htm (last modified 
Apr. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Lawyers’ Law] (translating Chinese law promulgated by the 
nineteenth meeting of the Eighth National People’s Congress Standing Committee on May 15, 
1996). The purpose of the Law on Lawyers and Legal Representation is stated in art. 1:  
to improve the system of legal representation, ensure that lawyers conduct their 
business in accordance with the law, standardize lawyers’ behaviour, protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of litigants, safeguard the correct enforcement of laws 
and bring into full play the positive role of lawyers in establishing a socialist legal 
system. 
Id. The Eighth National People’s Congress also included a provision concerning legal ethics. In 
art. 3, the National People’s Congress states:  
When setting up a practice, lawyers must abide by the Constitution and the law, and 
must scrupulously observe professional ethics and discipline. Lawyers who set up in 
practice must use facts as a basis and the law as criteria . . . . Lawyers who set up 
practice in accordance [with] the law are protected by the law.  
Id. This development of lawyers using facts as a basis and the law as guidance illustrates a 
move toward China’s governing entirely by law. Chongwei & Baichaun, supra note 1.  
 Furthermore, the Chinese government realizes that WTO entry requires it to “revamp its 
rules in line with international ones. It will have to improve its laws and regulations, increase 
the transparency of its legal and administrative systems, and smooth its market order.” China: 
WTO demands pain as price of gain, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 25, 1999, available at 1999 WL 
5969084.  
 17. See Gu, supra note 8, at 199-200. 
 18. Id. 
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offices in China.19  
Successful law firms also hint that developing relationships 
(guanxi) with Chinese government officials helped them obtain a 
license.20 For example, one American firm “regularly held training 
sessions for the Ministry of Justice Officials in its unofficial office in 
Beijing, teaching them how business transactions are structured, and 
hosted visiting dignitaries in Chicago.”21 These actions, albeit 
unofficial, help foreign law firms receive a license to practice law in 
China.22  
B. Geographical Ban 
Even if a foreign law firm manages to obtain a license, it may set 
up only one branch office in China.23 Under the Tentative Provisions, 
the foreign firm must choose from a restricted list of approximately 
fifteen cities.24 Law firms typically prefer to locate a satellite office in 
 
 19. Ann Davis, Shanghai Exit for Coudert, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 30, 1995, at A6 (describing 
the Coudert Brothers’ situation in 1995). The Coudert Brothers received a violation from the 
Ministry of Justice for having lawyers in two cities, violating the licensing and geographic 
regulations. Id. The Coudert Brothers, however, responded by sending their attorneys to an 
affiliate law firm in Hong Kong. Id. The firm does not plan to “curtail” its Shanghai business, 
but rather is requiring its affiliate office in Hong Kong to apply for a license to set up a branch 
office in Shanghai. Id. An official in the Ministry of Justice also noted that some foreign law 
firms set up unofficial offices in China. China: Legal service sector to open wider to foreigners, 
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 14, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7597299. 
 20. Davis, supra note 19, at A6. An official with the Administration for China Offices of 
Foreign Law Firms under the Ministry of Justice remarked, “[foreign law firms] must also come 
from countries with a good relationship with China.” China: Legal service sector to open wider 
to foreigners, supra note 19. According to the Ministry of Justice, foreign law firms are mainly 
from “Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Britain, Germany, United States, and France.” 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 22, 1996, available at LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; see 
also CONCISE ENGLISH-CHINESE CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 157 (Oxford University Press 
& The Commercial Press 1986) (defining the Chinese word guanxi as developing relationships 
or networking).  
 21. Adams, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing Altheimer & Gray’s activities for setting up a 
satellite office in China, as well as other American firms’ unofficial actions toward obtaining a 
license). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Gu, supra note 8, at 200. 
 24. See generally John Zarocostas, China’s Services Offer Fails, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 15, 
1997, at A13 (discussing China’s offer to lift the geographical ban restricting foreign firms to 
limited cities during WTO-entry talks). Most firms are in major cities such as “Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Haikou, Suzhou, and Qingdao.” A Profile of China’s Legal 
Services Industry, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 23, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2949839; see also Xiao, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/12
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either Beijing or Shanghai, cities included on the restricted list.25 As 
the governmental hub of China, Beijing provides a “strategic location 
for seeking the approvals [from the Chinese government] required for 
investment projects and business transactions in China.”26 Shanghai 
attracts foreign law firms as it is often considered the most important 
financial and commercial location in China.27 The popularity of these 
cities, however, contributes to the shortage of office space and 
housing for foreign attorneys, in addition to high rent, creating further 
difficulties.28  
Foreign law firms attempt to circumvent the geographical ban by 
operating consulting firms in cities where their law firms are not 
licensed. For example, the American firm of Baker & Mackenzie 
operated a consulting firm, B & M China Consultants, Ltd., in 
Shanghai while simultaneously operating a law practice in Hong 
Kong.29 Although Baker & Mackenzie maintained that their 
consulting firm did not employ lawyers, lawyers from their Hong 
Kong office occasionally utilized the Shanghai consulting office to 
conduct legal business.30 China’s Ministry of Justice, therefore, 
closed the firm’s Shanghai “consulting” office.31 Like Baker & 
Mackenzie, however, other foreign firms operate consulting offices in 
China.32 These foreign firms also allow their lawyers to conduct legal 
 
supra note 12, at 28 (listing other cities open to foreign law firms).   
 25. Steven Lozner, PRC legal services—Foreign law firms continue to lay foundations, 12 
CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 1998, at 45, 46. “The foreign legal market now shapes up with 42 
offices in Beijing, 32 in Shanghai, 12 in Guangzhou, and seven more covering Shenzhen, 
Tianjin, Qingdao, Haikou, and Suzhou. Of the 20 firms overall, ten will establish a branch in 
Shanghai, eight in Beijing, and one each in Tianjin and Qingdao.” Id. at 47.  
 26. Id. at 46. 
 27. Gu, supra note 8, at 200. 
 28. Adams, supra note 15. These costs are a combination of “[b]uilding relationships and 
opening offices . . . . Quality office space is at a premium, and U.S. expatriates generally 
receive housing subsidies, cost-of-living adjustments, and at least one paid trip home a year 
. . . .” Id. In a comparison between New York apartment rental prices and Beijing apartment 
rental prices, America’s Skadden Arps estimated that a New York apartment would be 
approximately two thousand dollars, while Beijing’s apartment would be approximately five 
thousand dollars. Id. Additionally, the combination of operating and living costs for foreign 
lawyers in either Beijing or Shanghai can reach approximately $800,000 a year. Id. 
 29. Davis, supra note 19 (discussing Baker & Mackenzie’s attempt to bypass the one city 
rule). Baker & Mackenzie contend they did not violate the Tentative Provisions. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (referring to the Coudert Brothers consulting office, which operated from 1984 to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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business in the cities and offices where their consulting businesses 
are located, thus violating both the geographical ban and the licensing 
restriction.  
C. Prohibition on Interpreting Chinese Laws 
The Tentative Provisions prohibit foreign law firms from 
interpreting Chinese laws, issuing opinions concerning those laws, or 
acting as an agent when dealing with Chinese legal business.33 
China’s prohibition against foreign firms interpreting Chinese laws 
and handling Chinese legal business forces Chinese clients to refer 
their grievances to Chinese law firms. Consequently, these 
restrictions protect China’s legal profession and allow Chinese law 
firms to capitalize on the domestic legal market.34  
D. Foreign Law Firms Cannot Hire Chinese Lawyers or Take the 
Lawyer’s Qualification Exam 
Article 17 of the Tentative Provisions prohibits foreign law firms 
from hiring Chinese lawyers.35 If foreign law firms employ Chinese 
lawyers, the Tentative Provisions require the Chinese lawyers to 
 
1995); see also Gu, supra note 8, at 199-200. 
 33.  Tentative Provisions, supra note 4, at 7. For example, art. 15 provides that foreign 
law firm may: (1) advise their clients on the “legislation of countries where its lawyers or its 
firm is permitted to practice and on relevant international treaties, international commercial law, 
and international practices”; (2) accept “a client’s or a Chinese law firm’s instruction to handle 
legal business in countries where the lawyers of its firm are permitted to practice”; and (3) act 
as an agent for “foreign clients, [instructing] Chinese law firms to handle legal business within 
China.” Id. Despite the prohibition of foreign lawyers from “[practicing] or advising on 
mainland law, and from hiring local lawyers . . . . [Foreign law firms] do these things 
everyday.” Collin Galloway, Legal services Foreign lawyers constrained by protectionist 
regulations Foreign lawyers have to use unofficial means to satisfy business demand for their 
services, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 13, 1998, at 4. Approved foreign lawyers advise 
clients about Chinese law. Adams, supra note 15; Sydney M. Cone III, partner at Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, states “Since an essential function of the Chinese offices of foreign 
law firms is to interpret Chinese law to their clients, the apparent meaning of the regulations 
will be suspended in this respect [so long as the Ministry of Justice does not object] . . . .” Id.; 
see also Gu, supra note 8, at 201 (citing Matt Forney, Outside the Law: Reform Reversals Hit 
Foreign Law Firms in China, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2, 1997, at 18). 
 34. See Lozner, supra note 25, at 50. 
 35. Edmonds, supra note 16, at 12. 
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surrender their license.36 Additionally, the government prevents 
foreign lawyers from taking China’s Lawyers’ Qualification Exam to 
preclude foreign lawyers from involvement in Chinese litigation, 
which may encompass sensitive political issues.37  
E. Foreign Law Firms Must Submit Confidential Client Information 
to the Chinese Government 
The Chinese government places restrictions on foreign law firms 
in their international business practice. The government requires 
foreign law firms to provide confidential client information in the 
form of client questionnaires.38 Foreign law firms must provide 
“quarterly reports” detailing “client lists, locations of projects under 
consideration, affiliations with Chinese law firms, business reference 
lists, and the value of deals in negotiation.”39 These restrictions, 
however, also apply to Chinese lawyers as the Chinese government 
may request confidential information from Chinese lawyers.40  
 
 36. Gu, supra note 8, at 200. 
 37. See Tamara Loomis, China Trade; Lawyers Gear Up for China’s Entry Into the WTO, 
N.Y.L.J., July 6, 2000, at 5. The Chinese bar is effectively the Lawyers’ Qualification Exam. Id. 
See also Xiao, supra note 12, at 30 (describing China’s rationale for prohibiting foreign lawyers 
from taking the Lawyers’ Qualification Exam). 
 38. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 49. 
 39. Gu, supra note 8, at 186-87 (quoting China Wants Lawyers’ Confidential Info, DOW 
JONES INT’L NEWS SERV., Sept. 18, 1996). 
 40. Id. (describing a hypothetical situation where the police demand lawyers’ files and the 
lawyers are powerless to oppose). This law is closely analogous to the American Bar 
Association’s (A.B.A.) Model Rule 1.6(a). Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 49. With regard to 
attorney-client relationships, “[a] lawyer should keep state secrets and a litigant’s commercial 
secrets learned through conducting the business activities of a lawyer’s practice, and should not 
disclose the privacy of litigants.” Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16, at art. 33. The Lawyers’ Law 
suggests that China may allow attorney-client privilege in its legal system. Id. If China is 
granting this privilege, it will increase the candor between attorneys and clients. Ginsberg, 
supra note 9, at 50. If China can increase the candor involved in the legal profession, then 
attorneys will be better able to advise and counsel clients. Id. If attorneys are better legal 
counselors, then they come closer to becoming normative experts. See generally Clark, supra 
note 7, at 281-82 (discussing lawyers as normative experts). As a result of the changes in 
China’s social and economic systems, normative ordering will be needed. Thus, the need for 
competent lawyers and enforced laws will become prevalent. This need will advance the legal 
profession and China’s ability to rule by law significantly.  
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F. Restrictions Imposed on the Chief Representative(s) of Foreign 
Law Firms 
In addition, the Chinese government places numerous restrictions 
on the foreign law firm’s chief representative(s). For example, the 
chief representative(s) at a foreign law firm must have passports from 
the law firm’s country of origin.41 Additionally, the chief 
representative(s) must have at least three years of practice experience 
in the firm’s “home country” with no discipline record.42 Finally, the 
chief representative(s) must reside in China for more than 180 days 
each year “so that they will be covered by China’s tax jurisdiction.”43  
 
 41. Gu, supra note 8, at 201-02 (citing Kathy Chen, China Set to Impose Tough Rules on 
Foreign Law Firms, EMERGING MARKET REP., Dec. 12, 1996). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Xiao, supra note 12, at 30. However, the restrictions on chief representative(s) may 
mirror the pre-existing practice of some foreign law firms. See Loomis, supra note 37. For 
example, some American firms send experienced lawyers to their branch offices in China, but 
the reasons for this practice may be independent of the restrictions. Id. Nicholas C. Howson, the 
chief representative of the branch office of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 
describes an important consideration when choosing the type of lawyers to send to a branch 
office in China. Id. Howson states that lawyers must have a “substantive knowledge of the legal 
systems of both countries.” Id. As China’s legal system is still developing, gaining substantive 
knowledge of the system can be difficult; however, “[l]awyers need to know what the 
regulation is, how it is articulated, how it is enforced and who enforces it.” Id. The acquisition 
of such knowledge requires some practical experience. Id. This assertion is especially true when 
conducting research because “‘China does not publish law in any central place.’ Only 
experienced lawyers know where to seek out the laws and administrative procedures.” Gu, 
supra note 8, at 206 (citing Victoria Slind-Flor, China Lawyers Suddenly Find They Have 
Become a Very Hot Commodity, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 26). Additionally, experienced 
lawyers arguably have a better understanding of “both the U.S. and Chinese business culture 
and political environment.” Loomis, supra note 37. Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson, “a partner in the 
Shanghai office of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, & Handler,” contends that “one side may 
have a particular request which may sound totally absurd to the other party.” Loomis, supra 
note 37. Therefore, an understanding of the business differences is helpful. For example, the 
Chinese “tend to bargain on price until the last minute.” Loomis, supra note 37. Thus, practical 
considerations, rather than the restrictions, motivate some foreign law firms to send experienced 
lawyers to their China offices.  
 Conversely, other foreign law firms do not send experienced lawyers to their China offices 
because of the restrictions and other practical considerations. See Gu, supra note 8, at 203-04. 
For example, some American law firms hesitate to send their best lawyers away from domestic 
practice. Gu, supra note 8, at 203. Rolf R. Boer, “Chair of Foley & Lardner’s international 
business practice and head of the management committee” states that “[t]alented lawyers don’t 
want to work in small, ancillary U.S. firms, and frankly, we can’t afford to send the best U.S. 
lawyers to foreign outposts because we need them for our domestic practice.” Gu, supra note 8, 
at 203. Additionally, requiring senior attorneys to uproot themselves and their families is 
difficult. Douglas McCollam, Let a Thousand Branch Offices Bloom, AM. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 
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II. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON FOREIGN LAW FIRMS IN JAPAN 
In 1987 Japan re-opened its doors to foreign lawyers, however, 
Japan’s regulatory provisions governing foreign lawyers remain the 
most restrictive to date.44 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(Nichibenren) developed the Special Measures Law Concerning the 
Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers (Law Number 66) to 
“‘promote stability in relation to international business law affairs,’ 
and ‘contribute to improvement in the handling, in foreign countries, 
of legal business concerning Japanese law’ . . . .”45 This law imposes 
stringent limitations on the qualifications of foreign lawyers in Japan, 
the naming of foreign law firms, the scope of a foreign lawyer’s 
practice, the relationship foreign lawyers may have with Japanese 
lawyers (Bengoshi), and the disciplinary procedures governing 
foreign lawyers in Japan.46  
 
92, 98. Furthermore, young lawyers “are generally more willing to work in China.” Gu, supra 
note 8, at 203 (citing Victoria Slind-Flor, China’s Riches Lure Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 29, 
1993, at 23, 26). Thus, the restrictions play a more invasive role for foreign law firms wanting 
to send young attorneys to their China offices.  
 Although young foreign lawyers are generally more willing to relocate to China, there is a 
growing concern among this group regarding their progress toward partnership if they practice 
at a foreign branch office. Gu, supra note 8, at 204. These young lawyers are afraid they will be 
forgotten or put at a disadvantage if they are practicing at “foreign outposts.” Gu, supra note 8, 
at 204. Moreover, the downsides to both the lawyers’ quality of life, particularly if they lack 
linguistic proficiency, and the firm’s effective and efficient practice may argue in favor of 
sending more experienced lawyers abroad. Gu, supra note 8, at 204. 
 44. Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International Trade in 
Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 941, 960 (1995); see also Linda A. Cooper, Is the Door 
Half Open or Half Shut? Japan’s Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal 
Business by Foreign Lawyers, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 417, 422-25 (1991) (discussing the law that 
re-opened Japan to foreign lawyers and the history behind Japan closing its doors to foreign 
lawyers).  
 45. J. Ryan Dwyer, III, Comment, The Door Only Opens Out: Japan’s Special Measures 
Law for Regulation of Foreign Attorneys, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 257, 265 (1996) (citation 
omitted); see Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by Foreign 
Lawyers, Law No. 66, May 23, 1986, translated in LAW IN JAPAN, 193 (Daniel H. Foote et al. 
eds., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1988) [hereinafter Law No. 66]. 
 46. Dwyer, supra note 45, at 266-77. 
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A. Qualifications 
Before foreign lawyers may practice in Japan, they must apply for 
a license with the Ministry of Justice.47 The Nichibenren requires a 
foreign lawyer requesting a license to have at least five years of legal 
practice in their home jurisdiction.48 Additionally, the applicant 
cannot have a disciplinary record.49 Moreover, the applicant’s home 
jurisdiction must supply reciprocity by allowing Bengoshi to practice 
law in that jurisdiction.50 Furthermore, approved applicants must 
register with Nichibenren and a local bar association, which subjects 
the foreign lawyer to the same “ethics rules, regulation and 
supervision” as Bengoshi.51  
In 1995, an amendment relaxed the requirement that foreign 
lawyers practice law in their home jurisdictions for at least five 
years.52 The amendment allowed foreign lawyers who previously 
worked in Japan as legal trainees, employed by Bengoshi, to credit 
two of those years toward the five-year practice requirement needed 
to obtain a license.53  
 
 47. Cooper, supra note 44, at 425-26. 
 48. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, § 10.1.1. The Japanese term for an approved 
foreign lawyer who is registered by the Ministry of Justice to practice law in Japan is 
Gaikokuho Jimu Bengoshi. Id. at ch. 1, § 2.0.3. 
 49. Id. at ch. 3, §§ 10.1.2.1-10.1.2.4. These sections preclude an applicant from having a 
disciplinary record including imprisonment, conviction for impeachment, and punishments 
delineated in Bengoshi law unless three years elapsed since the disciplinary punishment. Id.  
 50. Id. at ch. 3, § 10.2; see also Dwyer, supra note 45, at 266 (delineating the qualification 
requirements for foreign lawyers in Japan and stating that the Law No. 66 requires reciprocity 
unless reciprocity would “violate an international treaty or agreement”). 
 51. Shigeru Kobori, Symposium: Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal 
Profession Discussion Papers, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 109, 129-30 (1999). Kobori was the 
president of Nichibenren. Id. at 109. Kobori’s article states that Bengoshi are required to 
register with Nichibenren and a local bar association, and, therefore, foreign lawyers should be 
compelled to register as well. Id. at 129. Kobori argues that foreign lawyers “must adhere to the 
ethical standards of the Host Country.” Id. 
 52. Dwyer, supra note 45, at 268. 
 53. Id. Dwyer states that while this amendment does relax the original, rigid standard, it 
requires at least three years of experience practicing law. Id. This amendment forces foreign 
law firms to use more experienced attorneys in their satellite office, which results in higher 
salaried attorneys doing work which could be completed by newer associates. Id. at 269.  
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B. Residency Requirements and Foreign Law Firm Names and 
Number of Offices 
Foreign lawyers licensed to practice law in Japan (Gaikokuho 
Jimu Bengoshi) must reside in Japan for one hundred eighty days 
each year.54 In addition, foreign law firms must have a name 
consisting of the surname and given name of “one or more 
Gaikokuho Jimu Bengoshi who compose such office and shall not 
include the name of any other individual or organization.”55 
Furthermore, the Nichibenren restricts foreign law firms to only one 
satellite office.56 
C. Scope of Practice 
The Nichibenren restricts the scope of foreign legal practice. First, 
foreign lawyers may only conduct legal business concerning the law 
of their home jurisdiction.57 Second, the Nichibenren restricts foreign 
lawyers from providing legal “representation in regard to procedures 
before a court.”58 For example, foreign lawyers may not represent 
clients in criminal cases.59 Third, the Nichibenren precludes foreign 
lawyers from rendering opinions or interpretations on Japanese 
laws.60 Fourth, the Nichibenren prohibits foreign lawyers from 
“[r]epresentation in the entrustment of the preparation of a notarial 
 
 54. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 4, § 48.1; see also Kobori, supra note 51, at 128 
(reasoning that in order to satisfy the needs of clients in the host jurisdiction, “it is preferable 
that foreign lawyers reside in the Host Jurisdiction . . . and effective supervision cannot be 
expected if the foreign lawyers is not resident in that county”). 
 55. Law No. 66, supra note 54, at ch. 4, § 45.2.  
 56. Id. at ch. 4, § 45.5.  
 57. Id. at ch. 2, § 3.1. The exception to this restriction is if foreign lawyers have 
“substantial expertise” in the law of a country other than the lawyer’s home jurisdiction, then 
the foreign lawyer may be allowed to “provide legal services” regarding the laws of that second 
country. See Kobori, supra note 51, at 125-26. 
 58. Law No. 66, supra note 54, at ch. 3, § 3.1.1; see Kobori, supra note 51, at 125; see 
also Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, § 3.1.4 (prohibiting foreign lawyers from “service of 
procedural documents for a court or administrative agency of a foreign country”). 
 59. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, § 3.1.2. This provision also prohibits lawyers 
from “acting as attending adult in a juvenile protection case, or assistance in a case of a demand 
for investigation regarding the extradition of a fugitive criminal.” Id.  
 60. Id. at ch. 3, § 3.1.3; see Kobori, supra note 51, at 125. 
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deed.”61 Fifth, foreign lawyers may not engage in the preparation of 
documents or the representation clients whose primary purpose 
concerns property in Japan, including industrial property and mining 
rights.62 When faced with cases concerning property rights situated in 
Japan, foreign lawyers must refer the cases to Bengoshi.63 Finally, 
when a Japanese national is a party, foreign lawyers must work with 
or request advice from Bengoshi concerning family relations and 
inheritances governed by Japanese law.64  
D. Relationships with Bengoshi 
Foreign lawyers cannot employ Bengoshi.65 Traditionally, the 
Nichibenren did not permit foreign lawyers to form joint enterprises 
with Bengoshi for the purpose of sharing in profits or conducting 
legal business otherwise prohibited under Law Number 66.66 The 
1994 Amendment to Law Number 66, however, allows Bengoshi to 
employ foreign lawyers and allows “licensed foreign lawyers to 
engage in a ‘joint enterprise’ with a Bengoshi who has also been 
qualified for a minimum of five years.”67 
E. Disciplinary Proceedings 
The Nichibenren subjects foreign lawyers to disciplinary action if 
they violate the law, violate the rules of the Bengoshi Association or 
Nichibenren, “[disturb] the order or . . . the reputation of the 
Bengohsi Association to which [they belong] or Nichibenren,” or act 
 
 61. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, § 3.1.5; see Kobori, supra note 51, at 125.  
 62. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, § 3.1.6; see Kobori, supra note 51, at 125. 
 63. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 3, §§ 3.2-3.2.3. 
 64. Id. at ch. 3, §§ 3.2-3.2.3; see Kobori, supra note 51, at 125. 
 65. Id. at ch. 4, § 49.1; see also Dwyer, supra note 45, at 273-74 (describing the 
limitations on foreign lawyers association with Bengoshi). 
 66. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 4, § 49.2. Law Number 66 also prohibits a foreign 
lawyer from receiving “other profits gained by a specific Bengoshi in the performance of legal 
business.” Id. (emphasis added); see Dwyer, supra note 45, at 274. 
 67. Jason Comrie-Taylor, The “Appropriate” Role for Foreign Trainees in Japan, 15 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 323, 345, 346 (1997) (stating that a joint venture is “solely contractual 
. . . and no form of single legal or judicial joint entity in which both the Japanese lawyers and 
foreign lawyers participate will be permitted”). 
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with “disgraceful conduct” either in or out of their practice.68 
Nichibenren handles the disciplinary action against foreign lawyers in 
Japan “based upon the decision of the Gaikokuho Jimu Bengoshi 
Disciplinary Action Committee.”69 Disciplinary actions include the 
following: (1) warnings; (2) no more than two years suspension; (3) 
resignation; and (4) expulsion.70 Furthermore, if foreign lawyers 
exceed the scope of practice permitted, penal actions may proceed 
against them.71  
F. Amending Law Number 66 
Even at the inception of Law Number 66 in 1987, the U.S. Trade 
Representative pushed for liberalization of the regulations governing 
foreign lawyers.72 Approximately five years later, Japan relaxed three 
of these regulations.73 Scholars speculate that pressure from the 
United States contributed to Japan’s lifting these restrictions on 
foreign lawyers.74 There is also a strong possibility that Japan’s desire 
to accommodate and encourage foreign investment led to 
liberalization of these regulations.75 Japan’s membership in the 
 
 68. Law No. 66, supra note 45, at ch. 4, § 51.1 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at ch. 4, § 51.2 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at ch. 4, §§ 52.0.1-52.0.4. 
 71. Id. at ch. 6, § 63. For example, imprisonment “at hard labor for up to [two] years, or a 
fine of up to $1,000,000” is a possible disciplinary action against foreign lawyers who exceed 
the scope of their practice. Id.; see also Dwyer, supra note 45, at 277. 
 72. Comrie-Taylor, supra note 67, at 343-44 (listing five areas the U.S. Trade 
Representative wanted liberalized including: (1) allowing U.S. law firms to hire Bengoshi; (2) 
allowing U.S. law firms to enter into partnerships with Bengoshi; (3) allowing U.S. law firms to 
use their firm names in Japan; (4) allowing U.S. lawyers to participate in arbitration 
proceedings in Japan; and (5) allowing foreign lawyers to credit years of legal work handled in 
Japan to the five-year qualification requirement).  
 73. Japan: Legal controls anger foreign lawyers, LAW. INT’L, May 1994, available at 
LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Japan Country File. The changes included “allowing 
foreign lawyers to use their home firm’s name,” to attach, at most, two years of those training 
years to the five-year qualification requirement, and to enter into joint enterprises with 
Bengoshi. Id.  
 74. See generally Comrie-Taylor, supra note 67, at 344 (citing the United States as the 
instigator of talks regarding the opening of legal markets in Japan).  
 75. See generally ASIA PULSE, 25% of Top Makers Dissatisfied with Lawyers, Oct. 16, 
1997, available at LEXIS, Country & Region Library, Japan Country File (reporting that 
experts agree Japan is deficient in its number of legal professionals, as it is the lowest among 
industrialized nations regarding the ratio of legal professionals to its population); David Hood, 
Comment, Exclusivity and the Japanese Bar: Ethics or Self-Interest?, 6 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and WTO also 
provides an explanation for the amendment to Law Number 66 
because accession to GATS or the WTO requires negotiations with 
member countries toward the goal of opening world markets.76 
Japan’s membership in GATS and the WTO, however, does not 
supercede the other explanations mentioned for amending Law 
Number 66, despite the central goal of liberalizing world trade, which 
both of those organizations share.77 Nevertheless, the amendments to 
Law Number 66 eased only a few restrictions since foreign lawyers 
re-entered Japan in 1987. 
IV. CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
The WTO is “the international agency that administers 
multilateral trade rules.”78 When a country seeks membership in the 
WTO, “it submits a memorandum on its foreign trade regime and a 
WTO Working Party is formed . . . .”79 The applicant country must 
satisfy both a “multilateral track involving the Working Party and 
WTO members” and a “bilateral track[] between the applicant 
country and the individual members” of the WTO.80 The multilateral 
track’s goal is to “[identify] elements of applicant’s foreign trade 
regime that conflict with WTO obligations.”81 The bilateral track 
offers current members and the applicant country an opportunity to 
“negotiate market access commitments involving specific goods and 
services.”82 The applicant country must complete bilateral 
 
J. 199 (1997) (stating that only two percent of Japanese candidates pass Japan’s bar 
examination and as a result, the ratio of practicing lawyers to Japan’s population is one lawyer 
for every 10,000 people, the lowest ratio in the industrialized world).  
 76. Jeanne J. Grimmett, China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: Legal 
Issues, CRS Rep. RL30175, at 3 (June 2, 2000).  
 77. See generally Robert F. Taylor & Philippe Metzger, GATT and It’s Effect on the 
International Trade in Legal Services, 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (stating that that the 
aim of GATT and the WTO is liberalizing world trade, which includes legal services).  
 78. Wayne M. Morrison, China and the World Trade Organization, CRS Rep. RS20139, 
at 1 (Apr. 5, 2001).  
 79. Grimmett, supra note 76, at 3. The Working Party is the WTO entity that considers 
“the country’s application.” Id.; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1327 (1994). 
 80. Grimmett, supra note 76, at 3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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negotiations with all WTO members who request negotiations.83 
Additionally, the applicant country “must accept all WTO 
Multilateral Trade Agreements as a condition of their WTO 
membership.”84 The applicant country is also given a “Protocol of 
Accession.”85 For countries like China, which is a non-market 
economy, the Protocol “addresses issues specific to [the applicant 
country’s] economic conditions and may allow it to phase in certain 
obligations.”86  
In order to become a member, the applicant country must first 
persuade the Working Party.87 Then, the Working Party submits a 
report discussing commitments agreed to by the applicant country 
and “a schedule of bilateral market access commitments for trade in 
goods and services.”88 Finally, the highest authority in the WTO, the 
Ministerial Conference, makes the final decision on accession by a 
two-thirds majority vote.89 
A. China’s Reasons for Joining to the WTO 
China’s motivation to join the WTO is, in part, to ensure “greater 
market access for [its] exporters and protection from unilateral trade 
sanctions.”90 The WTO offers an improved “international trading 
environment for China,” and the WTO Dispute Resolution Process, 
which “provide[s] Chinese traders with opportunities to defend their 
own interests and resolve trade frictions more fairly.”91 Additionally, 
 
 83. Morrison, supra note 78, at 4. 
 84. Grimmett, supra note 76, at 3. 
 85. Id. Protocol of Accession is given to every applicant country, even those with a 
market economy. Id. at 3-4. The Protocol of Accession addresses “the particular rights and 
obligations of an acceding member.” Id. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. Morrison, supra note 78, at 2. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1. 
 90. China: WTO demands pain as price of gain, supra note 16 (quoting Zhang Hanlin, “a 
professor at the University of International Business and Economics”). 
 91. Id. China is arguably considered a developing nation. See Morrison, supra note 78, at 
3; see also Sean Leonard, When China Joins: The Power of WTO Dispute Resolution, CHINA L. 
& PRAC., July-Aug. 2000, at 36. This status has implications for the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), which guides the dispute resolution process. Id. The advantages to being 
a developing nation arise in the DSU’s “philosophy of sensitivity to, and accommodation of, the 
needs of developing country WTO members involved in trade disputes.” Id. at 37. This 
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membership in the WTO allows China to participate in the 
development of new WTO rules regarding trade.92 China’s entry into 
the WTO assures permanent normal trade relations with the United 
States, which in turn will lead to greater American investment.93 
Thus, entry into the WTO will bring an improved international 
trading environment for China in the form of the WTO Dispute 
Resolution Process and participation in the development of new 
WTO trade rules. These developments, however, will not come 
without cost. 
China’s bilateral negotiations with the United States exemplify 
some of the concessions required of China, particularly concessions 
regarding legal services.94 China’s fledgling legal services industry 
inhibits the country from making meaningful concessions related to 
those during WTO accession negotiations.95 China’s characterization 
of its legal services industry as fledgling results from Chinese 
lawyers’ “limited access to high-technology and world economics.”96 
With the nation’s change to a market economy, Chinese lawyers “are 
finding themselves outpaced by the fast development of a market-
oriented and knowledge-based economy.”97 Thus, China argues that 
its lawyers are “no match for foreign competitors and will suffer from 
intensified competition on the domestic market.”98 WTO accession, 
 
philosophy “extends from the initial negotiations of the parties through to the surveillance of 
compliance with the panel or Appellate Body decision resolving the dispute.” Id. Moreover, 
before appointing a Dispute Settlement Board, the DSU requires WTO members to “give 
special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country Members during 
consultations over a dispute.” Id. Additionally, a developing nation is given additional time 
regarding dispute settlement consultations and the preparation and presentation of its argument. 
Id. 
 92. Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions, CRS Rep. IB98014, at 15 (Apr. 
13, 2001). 
 93. Id. at 14. 
 94. See generally Morrison, supra note 5, at 10-11 (summarizing the agreements China 
made with the United States in the course of their bilateral negotiations). The United States and 
China completed the bilateral agreement on November 15, 1999 concerning China’s accession 
to the WTO. U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 202(8), 114 Stat. 880, 
893 (2000). 
 95. China: Geographic ban expected to end, CHINA DAILY, May 3, 1999, at 1, available 
at 1999 WL 17779188. Wu Mingde, Deputy Director of the Ministry’s Department of Lawyers 
and Notation, referred to the Chinese legal industry as a fledgling industry. Id. at 2. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. China: WTO demands pain as price of gain, supra note 16, at 2. 
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however, requires China to “afford ‘national treatment’ to foreign 
firms.”99 In an effort to strengthen such treatment, China’s bilateral 
agreement with the United States includes a requirement that China 
“open service sectors,”100 including legal services.101 This agreement 
would allow China to remove restrictions on foreign services over 
time and gradually expand foreign ownership from sector to sector.102 
Therefore, while current negotiations do not require China to make 
immediate concessions, China’s ability to protect its domestic 
industries with restrictive policies on foreign law firms is limited.103  
B. U.S. Response to China’s Accession to the WTO 
The United States recognizes China as one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world that remains outside multilateral trade 
rules.104 The United States also considers China an area where 
“extraordinary potential for growth exists.”105 As a result, the United 
States considers “[pursuing] market-opening initiatives” in China a 
primary trade policy.106  
American law firms wanting to establish satellite offices in China 
will benefit from greater market access. While the Chinese legal 
profession is still “fledgling,” American law firms may gain a 
 
 99. See Morrison, supra note 78, at 3. 
 100. Id. at 4 (requiring China open its service sectors, but not expressly mentioning legal 
services); see also Morrison, supra note 5, at 10 (parenthetically mentions opening legal 
services as part of China’s agreement).  
 101. Morrison, supra note 5, at 11 (updating Morrison’s report entitled China and the 
World Trade Organization; supra note 78, at 4).  
 102. Morrison, supra note 5, at 10.  
 103. Id. at 10. China’s response to these negotiations was optimistic. China: Tough 
bargaining ahead, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 21, 1999, at 8, available at 1999 WL 30608199. Long 
Yongtu, China’s Vice-Foreign Trade Minister and Chief, described these bilateral negotiations 
as the most difficult his team experienced. Id. Although Yongtu believes that WTO accession 
could cause some negative impacts on domestic markets, he stated “the initiative in opening the 
[Chinese] market [to foreign competition] is firmly in the hands of the Chinese Government and 
enterprises.” Id.  
 104. Morrison, supra note 5, at 9-11; see also Morrison, supra note 93, at 13 (stating that 
China’s trade is “too significant to remain outside multilateral trade rules”). 
 105. Rep. on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12901, supra note 5, 
at 52604; see also, Rep. on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 13116, 
supra note 5, at 24443 (discussing the benefits of China’s accession to the WTO). 
 106. Rep. on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12901, supra note 5, 
at 52607. 
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competitive advantage.107 George Haley, a San Francisco attorney 
with Pillsbury Madison & Sutro LLP who represents businesses in 
China, stated that “There’s money to be made for lawyers” in 
China.108 By allowing foreign law firms greater market access, there 
are more opportunities for the firms to make money.  
China’s compliance to its bilateral negotiations, however, is a 
concern for the United States. If China does not comply with its 
WTO commitments, then issues often overlooked, such as foreign 
law firms gaining market access in China, may be in jeopardy. 
Responsive to this concern, Shi Guangsheng, the Foreign Trade 
Minister and co-chair of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade, reaffirms the Chinese government’s 
commitment to acting in conformity with WTO requirements.109 
Additionally, China’s Premier Zhu Rongli reported that China’s 
ministry-level mediation agency helps to ensure China’s compliance 
to its WTO commitments.110  
Congress found, in part, that China is “committed to eliminating 
significant barriers in the . . . services . . . [sector].”111 Although this 
finding is positive for foreign law firms, Congress believes there is a 
need for effective monitoring and enforcement of China’s 
commitments under the WTO.112 As a safeguard, Congress continues 
to appropriate funds to the Department of Commerce and the 
 
 107. See China: Geographic ban expected to end, supra note 97. Foreign firms, however, 
are arguably more established and have unique administrative systems. See Xiao, supra note 12, 
at 30.   
 108. Loomis, supra note 37. 
 109. China: Normal trade relations with US emphasized, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 8, 2000, at 1, 
available at 2000 WL 4115376.  
 110. A promise made . . . China sets up ministry-level agency to make good on WTO vows, 
CHINAONLINE NEWS, at http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/NewsArchive/2000/july/ 
C00071306.asp (last visited July 14, 2000). The goals of the agency are to receive complaints 
from foreign businesses and ensure that China fulfills all of its commitments under the WTO. 
Id. 
 111. U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 411(4), 114 Stat. 880, 901 
(2000). 
 112. Id. at § 411(5); see also Geza Feketekuty & Peter Watson, WTO realities after 
Chinese accession, CHINAONLINE NEWS, at http://www.chinaonline.com/ 
commentary_analysis/wtocom/NewsArchive/secure/2000/june (last visited June 2, 2000) 
(quoting James Sasser, former U.S. Ambassador to China “testifying before the Senate Finance 
Committee on March 23, 2000 that Chinese implementation of its WTO commitments will take 
a long time and be uneven”). 
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Department of State for “monitoring compliance by [China] with its 
commitments under the WTO” and providing Congress with annual 
reports on that compliance.113 Congress also plans to appropriate 
funds to the U.S. Trade Representative for additional staffing in 
“offices relating to the WTO and to different sectors of the economy, 
including . . . services . . . to monitor and enforce the trade agreement 
obligations of [China].”114 Finally, the Senate proposes that the WTO 
implement a “special multilateral process” that annually reviews 
China’s compliance with its WTO commitments.115 
V. EFFECT OF CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION ON FOREIGN LAW FIRMS 
China will relax some of its regulations on foreign law firms as a 
result of the negotiations required for WTO entry. This result will 
not, however, affect many of the most severe limitations. 
Nonetheless, these restrictions are more likely to diminish gradually 
rather than as a result of current WTO negotiations. 
A. Changes in the Restrictions on Foreign Law Firms in China that 
Result Directly From WTO Accession 
China’s Justice Minister Gao Changli claims that “‘after China 
joins the [WTO], the legal service sector in China will be further 
opened’ . . . ‘in accordance with WTO commitments.’”116 China 
 
 113. U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 §§ 413(a)(1), (b)(1), 421(a). Congress will make 
these funds available beginning with the fiscal year 2001 and continuing “each fiscal year 
thereafter.” Id. at § 413(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 114. Id. at § 413(c)(4). 
 115. S. 2115, 106th Cong. § 6(a) (2000). The Senate wanted the WTO to implement “as 
part of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization, a thorough 
review of China’s trade policies be conducted each year . . . [and] include onsite visits and 
active participation by representatives of [WTO] members.” Id. at § 6(b)(1), (3). Furthermore, 
the United States must deal with the issue of its credibility when enforcing China’s 
commitments under the WTO; thus, the Clinton Administration made threats of revoking 
China’s Normal Trade Relations status, but took no action on these threats. James R. Lilley, 
Trade and the Waking Giant, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN 
INTERESTS, 36, 54 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie eds., The AEI Press, 1994). China 
responded by hardening its position. Id. This reaction is a result of China’s philosophy of “a 
firing of empty canons,” regarding empty threats. Id. Thus, if the United States fears 
compliance from China, it must use tougher diplomacy. Id. 
 116. Foreign Law Firms Establish China Branches, XINHUA, June 8, 2000, available at 
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plans to lift three of the current restrictions on foreign law firms 
within one year of accession. In addition, China plans to lift the 
geographic ban on foreign law firms.117 Finally, China intends to 
remove the current limit on the number of foreign law firms allowed 
to establish branch offices118 and to increase the number of firms with 
more than one branch office in the country.119  
The removal of these restrictions will benefit China because 
foreign law firms attract foreign investment to the nation.120 Chinese 
commentators expect that WTO accession will bring China 
approximately twelve million jobs every year.121 Officials predict that 
legal professionals will be in demand.122 Currently, China has 
approximately 110,000 lawyers and 8,300 law firms.123 Although 
these numbers reflect significant expansion in the Chinese legal 
profession over the past two decades, China still has gaps between 
the “demand and supply in terms of both quantity and quality. At 
present, there are only 0.7 lawyers for every 10,000 people in 
China.”124 Thus, China may lift these restrictions in order to 
compensate for its limited number of legal professionals while 
simultaneously encouraging the foreign investment prompted by 
WTO accession.  
 
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (citation omitted). 
 117. China opening up to foreign lawyers, INT’L L. UPDATE, May 1999, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publ’n File; see also Zarocostas, supra note 24 (stating 
China’s plan is to lift its geographical ban on foreign law firms within one year of entry); 
China: Legal service sector to open wider to foreigners, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 14, 1998, 
available at 1998 WL 7597299 (stating that China plans to lift its geographical ban on foreign 
law firms when it is admitted to the WTO). 
 118. Zarcostas, supra note 24. Eighty is the current quota on foreign law firms allowed to 
set up branch offices in China. 
 119. China: Legal service sector to open wider to foreigners, supra note 117.  
 120. See China: Legal service sector to open wider to foreigners, supra note 117; see also 
A Profile of China’s Legal Services Industry, supra note 24 (stating that the reason China 
initially allowed foreign law firms to have branch offices in China was because of foreign 
investors); State Councilor Wu Yi foresees economic openness after WTO entry, supra note 6. 
 121. China: WTO entry to bring job opportunities, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 26, 1999, at 6, 
available at 1999 WL 17783758 (referring to an article from Beijing Evening News). 
 122. Id. 
 123. A Profile of China’s Legal Services Industry, supra note 24. 
 124. Id. The Chinese lawyer-client ratio is far below the United States ratio of thirty 
lawyers per ten thousand clients. Id. 
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B. Possible Changes in the Restrictions on Foreign Law Firms that 
Evolve From the Economic Changes Caused by the WTO 
President Jiang Zemin supports a recent Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) declaration, which includes the statement, “As 
leaders, we accept responsibility for resisting protectionism [and] 
opening markets further . . . .”125 The economic expansion resulting 
from China’s entry into the WTO and negotiations that continually 
push China toward resisting protectionism will catalyze a demand for 
China to create new laws and provide more competent legal 
professionals.126 When China is able to resist protectionism, foreign 
law firms will then experience easier market access and more 
autonomy in the scope of their China practices.  
As a logical corollary, China must first define the role of lawyers 
in its society before it can combat protectionism.127 China’s lawyers 
began as “legal service worker[s] of the state,” but today, they carry 
the more independent title of “legal service worker[s].”128 The Law 
 
 125. China: WTO issues discussed, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 14, 1999, at 2, available at 1999 
WL 17782314. 
 126. Id.; see also China: Lawyers May face WTO challenges, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 10, 2000, 
at 3, available in 2000 WL 4114452 (referring to Duan Zhengkun, Vice-Minister of Justice in 
China, who defined China’s goals for its legal profession as: (1) “enhancing attorney 
competence;” (2) “expanding local law firms;” and (3) “improving the supervision of the legal 
profession”). The Lawyers’ Law encourages attorney competence by providing attorneys with 
more autonomy. See Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16, at art. 25. The Lawyers’ Law also expands 
local law firms by allowing lawyers to set up private law firms. Id. at arts. 16-17. Finally, the 
Lawyers’ Law improves the supervision of the legal profession by establishing a bar association 
that is both a legal entity and an organization where lawyers exercise self-discipline. Id. at arts. 
37, 40. See generally Clark, supra note 7 (discussing reasons that catalyze the demand for 
lawyers in society). 
 127. See generally Clark, supra note 7, at 281 (postulating that the role of lawyers in 
society is “to create, find, interpret, adapt, apply and enforce rules and principles that structure 
human relationships and interactions”). The role of lawyers in normative ordering is composed 
of at least six areas: (1) advocating and lobbying for legislation or serving as legislators; (2) 
lobbying and advocating administrative rule-making; (3) private deal-making, such as 
negotiating and drafting agreements; (4) counseling and advising clients; (5) using alternative 
dispute resolution techniques, such as arbitration or mediation; and (6) litigation. Id. at 281-82.  
 128. Ma Chenguang, Role of lawyers to be expanded, CHINA DAILY, June 24, 1996, at 13 
available at 1996 WL 8531404. In reviving the Chinese legal system, Communism was not 
lost. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 48. Thus, the “Chinese perceived law as the government’s 
instrument for maintaining social order.” Id. As a result, the Chinese considered lawyers to be 
“legal services [workers] for the state.” Id. Lawyers were not “considered independent of the 
state and were not needed to protect the individual’s rights.” Id. at 49. As “state legal workers,” 
the Chinese government demanded lawyers “uphold the correct implementation of the law, 
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on Lawyers and Legal Representation (Lawyers’ Law), enacted in 
1997, explains this change, as it replaced the Interim Regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (Interim Regulations).129 
This evolution of China’s legal professionals expands the role of 
lawyers in China’s society.130 Chinese lawyers also gain competence 
in areas such as private deal-making, counseling, and advising clients 
 
while at the same time protect the interests of the state, the collective, and the citizens . . . . 
Consequently, lawyers enjoyed no professional autonomy from the politics and administration 
of the Chinese government.” Id.  
 129. Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16. The Eighth National People’s Congress, in enacting the 
Lawyers’ Law, abolished the Interim Regulations as the governing rules for Chinese lawyers. 
Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (Jan. 1, 1982), available at 
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw59.htm [hereinafter Interim Regulations]; see also Ginsberg, 
supra note 9, at 48 (explaining Chinese attitudes on lawyers); Cynthia L. Baraban, Inspiring 
Global Professionalism: Challenges and Opportunities for American Lawyers in China, 73 
IND. L.J. 1247, 1252-62 (1998) (discussing the evolution of China’s legal profession).  
 130. See generally Clark, supra note 7 (discussing reasons attributed to the expansion of 
lawyers in society). For example, through the Lawyers’ Law, Chinese lawyers may have “law 
offices financed by the state” or “establish [a] cooperative law office” or “set up a law office in 
partnership.” Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16, at arts. 16-18. In contrast, the Interim Regulations 
provided that “legal advisory offices shall be the business organizations for which lawyers 
perform their duties. Legal advisory offices shall be public institutions under the organizational 
leadership and professional supervision of the judicial administrative organs of the state.” 
Interim Regulations, supra note 129, at art. 13. Thus, the Chinese government controlled the 
legal profession in the provisions of the Interim Regulations and did not provide lawyers with 
the option of entering into private practice.  
 Moreover, the Interim Regulations did not allow lawyers to find their own clients, or 
clients to choose their lawyers. Id. at art. 17. “The mandates for lawyers to handle cases shall be 
accepted and service fees collected exclusively by the legal advisory office. In the distribution 
of cases to lawyers, the legal advisory office shall, as best as possible and according to actual 
conditions, assign lawyers as requested by clients.” Id.  
 By contrast, the Lawyers’ Law allows lawyers to “accept appointment by citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations to act as their legal advisers.” Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16, at 
art. 25. Additionally, a client “who has commissioned a lawyer to handle a case for him or her 
may refuse to let the lawyer continue to defend or act as a representative for the case, or 
commission another lawyer to act as his or her defender or representative.” Id. at art. 29. Thus, 
the Lawyers’ Law gives attorneys more autonomy in choosing the clients they represent, and 
clients also possess more authority in choosing which lawyers represent them. A subset to 
Article 29 gives lawyers additional autonomy when it states:  
After a lawyer accepts a commission to handle a case, he or she must not refuse to 
defend or act as a representative without good reason. However, if the case 
commissioned is illegal and if the client uses the services provided by a lawyer to 
conduct illegal activities or conceal a fact, a lawyer has the right to refuse to act as a 
defender or a representative for such a case.  
Id. 
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by the increased autonomy the Lawyers’ Law provides.131  
China’s lawyers, however, will not become legal experts 
overnight.132 This expertise will increase and evolve with the addition 
of laws and economic changes in Chinese society.133 Consequently, 
China will protect its domestic legal market by retaining certain 
restrictions on foreign law firms.134  
The majority of foreign multinational companies choose foreign 
law firms to service their investment needs in China because of the 
host nation’s lack of legal competence.135 Foreign businesses prefer 
foreign law firms “because of their experience and training, which 
are needed for dealing with the complex legal issues of these 
clients.”136 The restrictions on chief representative(s) in foreign law 
firms, however, allow Chinese lawyers access to the management 
structure and legal skills of foreign law firms. The restrictions on the 
chief representative(s) also ensure an advanced skill level because the 
chief representative(s) must have at least three years of practical 
experience.137 In addition, these restrictions ensure integrity because 
the chief representative(s) cannot have a discipline record.138 Finally, 
the restrictions allow Chinese lawyers access to chief 
representative(s) by requiring that the chief representative(s) reside in 
China for more than 180 days.139 Therefore, because the restrictions 
 
 131. See Lawyers’ Law, supra note 16, at art. 25.  
 132. See A Profile of China’s Legal Services Industry, supra note 24. 
 133. See generally Clark, supra note 7 (discussing areas of lawyers’ expertise). 
 134. See Zarocostas, supra note 24. For example, China insists on continuing restrictions 
concerning the chief representative(s) of a foreign law firm and foreign law firms’ hiring 
Chinese lawyers. Id. In addition, Wu Mingde, Secretary-General of the All-China’s Lawyers 
Association (ACLA) stated “I am confident that the Chinese lawyers are capable of competing 
with their foreign counterparts . . . in view that foreign firms must co-operate with Chinese 
lawyers under many circumstances . . . .” Lawyers upbeat on WTO, CHINA DAILY, at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/wto/news/b27lawyer.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2000). Indeed, foreign law firms must co-operate with Chinese lawyers because foreign law 
firms, according to the Tentative Provisions, must give Chinese law firms legal business in 
China. Tentative Provisions, supra note 4, at art. 15. 
 135. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 48. 
 136. Id.; see Collin Galloway, supra note 33, at 4. Galloway’s editorial proffers that 
“mainland lawyers lack both the experience and depth of talent required to compete effectively 
with international counterparts.” Id.  
 137. Gu, supra note 8, at 202. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Xiao, supra note 12, at 30. 
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on the chief representatives(s) have benefits, relaxation of the 
restrictions on chief representative(s) of foreign law firms is an 
unlikely result of China’s entry to the WTO.  
Lifting the prohibition on foreign law firms hiring Chinese 
lawyers, as a condition of China’s accession to the WTO, is also 
unlikely. China must expand the number of its lawyers to 
successfully compete with foreign law firms. If China permitted 
foreign law firms to hire Chinese lawyers, then China would face the 
potential problem of losing many of its lawyers to foreign firms.140  
The likelihood of China’s easing these restrictions on foreign law 
firms gradually, however, is high, particularly as Chinese lawyers 
advance their legal competence. As Japan demonstrated, the 
liberalization process merely chips away at the restrictions imposed 
on foreign lawyers rather than eliminates them as a condition of entry 
into the WTO. Moreover, the liberalization process occurs more as a 
result of economic factors than accession to the WTO. Thus, the 
international marketplace will reduce many of China’s severe 
restrictions on foreign law firms.  
VI. EXPEDITING MARKET ACCESS FOR FOREIGN LAW FIRMS  
IN CHINA 
China’s primary concerns are protecting its domestic legal market 
and membership in the WTO in order to encourage foreign 
investment. The United States must address these issues to expedite 
market access for foreign law firms. Three distinct measures 
exercised by the United States may open China’s doors to foreign law 
firms. First, the United States, as well as foreign law firms, can 
encourage skill-exchange between foreign lawyers and Chinese 
lawyers. Secondly, in addition to monitoring and enforcing China’s 
WTO commitments, the United States can also help China develop 
its laws and market economy. Finally, the United States can make 
market access for foreign law firms a primary focus of continuing 
WTO negotiations. Taking these steps helps China develop while 
 
 140. See also Gu, supra note 8, at 202 (reasoning that foreign law firms cannot hire 
Chinese lawyers because the Chinese government fears that foreign law firms would hire “away 
the best Chinese lawyers”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/12
p223 Vitale  4/24/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001]  Doors Widen to the West 249 
 
 
simultaneously pushing China towards allowing market access for 
foreign legal services.  
A. Encouraging Skill-Exchange Between Foreign Lawyers and 
Chinese Lawyers 
As mentioned earlier, China expects the demand for legal 
professionals to rise significantly with its WTO entry. In response, 
China hopes to allow some form of “internship” for Chinese lawyers 
in foreign law firms.141 Additionally, American lawyers realize that 
“‘China is recognizing the benefits of skill-exchange expertise, which 
is crucial to the development of a modern and competitive business 
infrastructure.’”142 Thus, American law firms as well as the U.S. 
government could successfully encourage skill-exchange as a 
mechanism for Chinese lawyers to develop increased competence.  
Such an internship would allow Chinese lawyers to experience the 
management structure of foreign law firms and the legal skills of 
foreign lawyers. Furthermore, the skill-exchange program would not 
threaten China’s future legal system, as the United States does not 
immediately press China to lift the restriction on foreign law firms 
hiring Chinese lawyers.143 Thus, China may effect some concessions 
in the area of legal services as result of skill-exchange programs, 
thereby increasing lawyer competence in China. Foreign 
multinational companies may be more likely to seek the assistance of 
Chinese lawyers as their level of competence increases. 
Consequently, by effectively lessening one of China’s principal 
concerns, the United States would be in a better position to push 
toward greater market access in China.  
 
 141. Chris Klein, China Relents on Its Law Firm Rules, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 30, 1996, at A7. 
Nicholas Howson proposed this idea of allowing Chinese lawyers to stay with foreign firms for 
a period of time. Id. China’s Vice-Minister of Justice, Duan Zhengkun “[hopes] that increasing 
contact with overseas law firms . . . will bring China’s legal profession to a new stage of 
development.” China: Lawyers may fact WTO challenges, supra note 126. 
 142. Rozner, supra note 25, at 50. 
 143. Morrison, supra note 78, at 2-3. Although, the United States argued that the “Chinese 
government policies [are] designed to protect and promote domestic industries.” Id. at 2. 
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B. United States Helps China Develop Laws and Market Economy 
Congress statutorily mandated that developing China’s ability to 
rule by law and encouraging the creation of democratically 
implemented laws are goals of the U.S. Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China.144 Congress also authorized the Secretary of 
State to establish programs that aid China in developing its laws, 
legal system, and civil society145 and the U.S. Trade Representative 
“to prevent . . . market disruption.”146 Preventing market disruption 
requires both helping China develop its market economy and legal 
system, while concurrently monitoring these developments.  
The United States’ aid to China’s developing market economy and 
legal system, combined with the monitoring and enforcement 
techniques implemented by Congress, will expedite China’s 
development as a reformed country. The faster China develops, 
without compromising the quality of development, the further the 
United States can advance negotiations to ease restrictions on foreign 
law firms in China.  
C. Making Market Access for Foreign Law Firms the Chief 
Negotiation Topic 
Currently, market access for foreign law firms in China is a 
secondary focus for the United States.147 China’s key concerns of 
protecting its legal service market and developing its market 
economy partially prevent the United States from demanding China 
open its doors to foreign legal services. As the United States 
addresses China’s concerns, through skill-exchange programs, 
developing China’s legal system and market economy, and 
monitoring and enforcing China’s WTO commitments, China will be 
more willing to negotiate for greater access for foreign law firms. In 
addition, concentrating on China’s primary fears allows the United 
States to make market access for foreign law firms a focal point as 
 
 144. U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 302(c)-(d), 114 Stat. 880, 
896-97 (2000).  
 145. Id. at § 511(c). 
 146. Id. at § 421(j). 
 147. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 11. 
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negotiations with China continue, which will also expedite market 
access in this area.  
CONCLUSION  
China is now a member of the WTO. WTO negotiations, however, 
have ignored market access for foreign law firms in China.148 
Although China’s accession to the WTO will bring greater market 
access for some foreign legal services, many restrictions on foreign 
law firms are likely to remain for several years. The immediate 
easing of certain restrictions as a condition of WTO accession merely 
begins the process of opening China’s legal services market to 
foreign law firms. Thus, while the WTO may effect some direct 
changes in the restrictions on foreign law firms in China, the greatest 
results will evolve from China’s increased participation in the 
international marketplace.  
 
 148. Id. at 110. Legal services is parenthetically mentioned as part of the bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and China. Id. 
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